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Recent Decisions
THE PENNSYLVANIA HUMAN RELATIONS ACT-EMPLOYMENT DISCRIM-
INATION-BURDEN OF PROOF-The Pennsylvania Supreme Court
has held that an employer is not under a duty for purposes of the
Human Relations Act to set out specific job requirements for each
position it offers. Furthermore, a complainant under the Act, in
order to establish a prima facie case of discrimination, must have
been "best able and most competent" for the position.
Fairfield Township Volunteer Fire Company No. 1 v Pennsylva-
nia Human Relations Commission, Pa , 609 A2d 804 (1992).
In 1982 Sarah Henderson ("Henderson") applied for a position
with the Fairfield Township Volunteer Fire Company ("fire com-
pany").' The fire company took no action on her application be-
cause its by-laws did not permit female members.2 Henderson filed
a complaint with the Pennsylvania Human Relations Commission
("PHRC") alleging that the fire company had violated the Penn-
sylvania Human Relations Act' ("the Act") through its refusal to
1. Fairfield Township Volunteer Fire Company No. 1 v Commonwealth of Pennsyl-
vania, Pennsylvania Human Relations Commission, Pa , 609 A2d 804, 805 (1992).
2. Fairfield, 609 A2d at 805.
3. 43 Pa Stat § 955(a) (Purdon 1991). The Act provides in pertinent part:
§ 955. Unlawful Discriminatory Practices.
It shall be an unlawful discriminatory practice, unless based upon a bona fide occupa-
tional qualification,
(a) For any employer because of the race, color, religious creed, ancestry, age, sex,
national origin, or non-job related handicap . . .of any individual . . . to refuse to
hire or employ ... or to bar or to discharge from employment such individual ... if
the individual . . . is the best able and most competent to perform the services
required.
43 Pa Stat § 955(a) (Purdon 1991).
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take action on her application. The fire company subsequently
amended its by-laws to permit female members.6 After her applica-
tion was considered, Henderson was interviewed by the fire com-
pany's screening committee which ultimately recommended her for
membership.' In June of 1982, the fire company members voted
not to accept Henderson as a member. The company did, however,
accept a male applicant while considering Henderson's applica-
tion.7 It was the second time in the history of the fire company
that an applicant had not been accepted.'
At the time of application, Henderson was aware that she may
have been unable to perform some of the job functions of a fire
fighter because she suffered from heart and back ailments.9 How-
ever, the fire company was not officially aware of these conditions
at the time of the vote.10 In fact, it was admitted by the president
of the fire company who had conducted a screening of Henderson
that although he did not remember inquiring about her health,
Henderson fit all of the qualifications when she was recommended
for membership." Moreover, at the time of her application, the fire
company had not established any job descriptions describing phys-
ical requirements for fire fighters. 2 However, in 1984 the fire com-
pany amended its by-laws to establish written physical
requirements.' 3
After the fire company rejected her membership request, Hen-
derson amended her original complaint filed with the PHRC, alleg-
ing that the fire company's rejection of her membership violated
4. Fairfield, 609 A2d at 805.
5. Id. The by-laws were amended after a meeting was held to vote on it amendment.
Of the thirty-three votes case, twenty-three voted "yes" to permitting female members and
ten voted "no". Id at 808.
6. Id.
7. Id at 805. The members voted by a secret ballot in which Henderson received
twelve "yes" and nineteen "no" votes. Fairfield Township Volunteer Fire Co. No. 1 v Com-
monwealth of Pennsylvania, Pennsylvania Human Relations Commission, 133 Pa Commw
45, 575 A2d 152, 153 (1990), rev'd, Pa , 609 A2d 804 (1992).
8. Fairfield, 609 A2d at 808.
9. Id at 806. Henderson had testified to being born with a hole in her heart and to
spending 106 days in the hospital when she was younger from an infection which settled in
the hole. Id. The fire company was not officially aware of this when she applied for the
position, however, there was testimony from at least one fire fighter that he had voted
against Henderson's membership because he had heard she had heart and back problems.
Id.
10. Id.
11. Id at 808.
12. Id at 805.
13. Id at 809.
608 Vol. 31:607
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the Act.1 4 After conducting an investigation, the PHRC found, in-
ter alia, that: (1) the fire company's screening process had become
relaxed during the years; (2) the secret ballot vote by members was
not a requirement for membership; and (3) the Secretary of the
Fire Company had told Henderson that he believed she was re-
jected because of her gender.1 5 The PHRC found cause to believe
that the fire company had violated the Act and held a public hear-
ing in December of 1988.16 At the hearing Henderson testified that.
she may have not been able to perform some of the required fire
fighting tasks. 17 Nevertheless, the PHRC found that Henderson's
allegations set forth a prima facie case of illegal sex discrimination
under the Act.18 Accordingly, the hearing examiner made recom-
mendations that were adopted by the PHRC which ordered the
fire company to amend its procedures for granting membership
and to accept Henderson as a member.1 9
The fire company appealed to the Commonwealth Court of
Pennsylvania.20 The court rejected the fire company's claim that
Henderson failed to set forth a prima facie case of employment
discrimination because of her testimony that she could not per-
form some of the fire fighting tasks. 21 The court instead found that
"at the time Complainant applied for membership, there were no
physical requirements established for the position. '22 Notwith-
standing the lack of written physical requirements, the court va-
cated the order of the PHRC and remanded the case because of
the appellate court's determination that evidence had been admit-
ted improperly and that the remedy granted was overbroad.23
14. Id at 805.
15. Fairfield, 575 A2d at 153.
16. Fairfield, 609 A2d at 805.
17. Id at 806.
18. Fairfield, 575 A2d at 154 (citation omitted).
19. Id. The PHRC also ordered that the fire company take affirmative steps to re-
cruit female fire fighters, that it dispense with the secret ballot as method of hiring, and
that it establish fair hiring procedures in which the reasons for any rejection be written in
detail by the individual who has an impact on the hiring decision. Id at 153.
20. Id at 154. On appeal the fire company contended that the record did not establish
that Henderson had made a prima facie showing of discrimination. Id. The fire company
.also maintained that the PHRC had made its determination of illegal discrimination based
on inadmissible hearsay evidence. Id. The fire company's final assertion was that the remedy
granted by the PHRC was broad and unreasonable. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id at 155-56. Specifically, the court held that the statement of the Secretary of
the fire company which indicated his belief that Henderson's rejection was based on her
gender was inadmissible hearsay because the Secretary did not testify before the PHRC. Id.
1993
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Both the fire company and the PHRC petitioned the Pennsylva-
nia Supreme Court for allowance of appeal.2" The supreme court
denied the PHRC's petition2s but granted allocatur26 to the fire
company's claim that Henderson had failed to set forth a prima
facie case of sex discrimination.2
The sole issue raised on appeal was whether Henderson had es-
tablished a prima facie case of illegal sex discrimination under the
Act when she had testified that she was physically unable to per-
form some job activities, but when the fire company had not estab-
lished specific physical qualifications for the position.2" The court
held that a complainant under the Act could not set forth a prima
facie case of sex discrimination if, at the time of application, the
complainant was unable to perform the tasks incident to the job.29
Furthermore, the court decided that an employer is under no stat-
utory duty to set forth written job descriptions for employment
positions.30
In so concluding, the court applied a four-prong test to deter-
mine what constituted a prima facie case of employment discrimi-
Furthermore, the court found that the remedy granted was overbroad in that the PHRC
ordered that the fire company dispense with the secret ballot without regard to whether this
was the existing hiring method before Henderson had applied, or whether such method was
only implemented to deal with Henderson's application. Id at 156. Moreover, the court
found that by requiring each rejection be supplemented with a written description of the
reasons therefor, the PHRC's order was too burdensome as it would require each member to
give written reasons for a vote of "no" in the case of a vote not by secret ballot, and could
not even be carried out in the case of a vote by secret ballot. Id.
24. Fairfield, 609 A2d at 805.
25. See Fairfield Township Volunteer Fire Company No. 1 v Commonwealth of
Pennsylvania, Pennsylvania Human Relations Commission, 526 Pa 655, .586 A2d 923
(1991).
26. "Allocatur" is a latin term used to describe the allowance of appeal by the Penn-
sylvania Supreme Court for its review of the case. It literally means "it is allowed." Black's
Law Dictionary 75 (West, 6th ed 1991).
27. Fairfield, 609 A2d at 805.
28. Id at 804.
29. Id at 806. The court's analysis was based on the view that in order for an appli-
cant to prove discrimination, there must be a showing of qualification for a particular posi-
tion. Id. Therefore, the court stated that it should not be troublesome in this case to discern
that a fire fighter needs to be physically fit. Id. Since Henderson's own testimony proved
that she was not physically fit, and in her testimony she admitted that there were some fire
fighting activities she felt she could not do, the court found that Henderson had automati-
cally disqualified herself for the position. Id.
30. Id. The court's conclusion was not based on precedent, but rather on the Act
itself which does not set forth a duty to employers to provide written job descriptions for
each position. Id. Furthermore, the court found that although the absence of written re-
quirements may make evaluation of some discrimination cases difficult, in this case the ab-
sence of such a requirement was inconsequential because a fire fighter must obviously be
physically fit. Id.
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nation. 1 Under this test, the complainant must show:
(1) that the plaintiff belongs to a racial or other minority;
(2) that plaintiff applied and was qualified for a job for which employer was
seeking applicants;
(3) that, despite the plaintiff's qualifications, he/she was rejected; and
(4) that, after the rejection, the position remained open and the employer
continued to seek applicants from persons of the plaintiff's
qualifications."'
Once a complainant established the above four factors, the
court reasoned that:
The burden shifts to the defendant. . to produce evidence of a legitimate,
non-discriminatory reason for the discharge [or failure to hire]. . . . If such
evidence is presented, the question . . is whether, on all the evidence pro-
duced, the plaintiff has persuaded it by a preponderance of the evidence
that the employer has intentionally discriminated against her.53
The court opined that since the plaintiff had admitted in her
testimony that she may not have been able to perform some job
activities, she clearly had not proven that she was "qualified" as
required by the test.34 Therefore, she had not made out a prima
facie case of employment discrimination. 5 The court further held
that the commonwealth court erred in relying on the employer's
lack of established written requirements for the position in finding
that Henderson had made out the prima facie case since an em-
ployer is under no statutory duty to set forth written job descrip-
31. The Court based its opinion on the United States Supreme Court decision in
McDonnell Douglas Corporation v Green, 411 US 792 (1973). McDonnell Douglas involved
an alleged violation of Section 703(a)(1) of the Civil Rights of 1964, 42 USC § 2000e-2(a)(1)
(1992), by McDonnell Douglas Corporation in refusing to rehire a black civil rights activist
who retaliated against his discharge through illegal and disruptive activity aimed at the
Corporation. Id at 794-96.
Section 703(a)(1) of the Civil Rights Act provides: "It shall be an unlawful employment
practice for an employer . . . to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual ...
because of . . . race, color, religion, sex or national origin ...... 42 USC § 2000e-2(a)(1)
(1992).
The court, relying on its earlier decision in Allegheny Housing Rehabilitation Corpora-
tion v Pennsylvania Human Relations Commission, 516 Pa 124, 532 A2d 315 (1987), reaf-
firmed the application of the McDonnell test in employment discrimination cases. Fairfield,
609 A2d at 805-06. Allegheny Housing involved an alleged violation of the Act by Allegheny
Housing Rehabilitation Corporation through the discharge of a female security officer after
two months of employment. Allegheny Housing, 532 A2d at 316-17.
32. Fairfield, 609 A2d at 805 citing McDonnell Douglas Corporation v Green, 411 US
792, 802 (1973).
33. Fairfield, 609 A2d at 805-06 (citations omitted).
34. Id at 806.
35. Id.
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tions.36 Moreover, the court determined that under the Act's defi-
nition of unlawful discriminatory practices, it must be proven that
the complainant was the "best able and most competent" to per-
form the job. 7 Since Henderson admitted that there were some
fire fighting activities that she may not have been able to perform,
she was clearly not "best able and most competent" for the posi-
tion. Accordingly, she had not made a prima facie showing of sex
discrimination."
Justice Cappy, in a concurring opinion, disagreed with the ma-
jority opinion to the extent that it proposed that the prima facie
showing of employment discrimination included proof of being
"best able and most competent."3 9 Justice Cappy stated that no
majority of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court had ever placed such
a burden of proof on the plaintiff. 0 Accordingly, Justice Cappy
dissented from the majority opinion insofar as it attempted to es-
tablish this as a fifth prong to the four-prong test.41 However, Jus-
tice Cappy concurred to the extent'that the majority intended that
the requirement merely restate the fourth prong of the McDonnell
test.
42
Justice Zappala,"' in a dissent, disagreed with the majority's con-
clusion that Henderson had not made out a prima facie showing of
illegal sex discrimination under the Act." Justice Zappala con-
tended that the majority had misunderstood the opinion of the
commonwealth court as requiring the employer to provide written
job descriptions for each position."6 Instead, Justice Zappala un-
derstood the commonwealth court as holding that Henderson had
made out a prima facie case of discrimination because at the time
she applied for the position, there were no physical requirements
for the job, written or unwritten.46 Since the fire company had not
imposed any physical requirements on the men it had hired in the
past, Justice Zappala concluded that it was illegal to impose any
36. Id.
37. Id at 807. The court, interpreting the Act, defined unlawful discriminatory prac-
tices as "various acts which are directed towards individuals who are 'best able and most
competent to perform the services required.'" Id (citation omitted).
38. Id.




43. Justice Larsen joined in the dissenting opinion. Id.
44. Fairfield, 609 A2d at 807 (Zappala dissenting).
45. Id at 807-08.
46. Id at 808.
Vol. 31:607
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such requirements on women.'7 Hence, he held that Henderson
was qualified for the position and that her physical condition was
irrelevant at the time she applied.4 8 Justice Zappala supported this
conclusion by noting that her physical condition was not presented
as a reason for her rejection, and that the fire company merely
used such reason as an excuse subsequent to her rejection.
4 9
Prior to the passage of the Pennsylvania Fair Employment Prac-
tice Act, 50 unfair discriminatory practices had not been regulated
to any significant degree.51 The first Fair Employment Practice
Commission bill was introduced in 1945 in an effort to recognize
the need for a civil rights law in Pennsylvania.52 In 1948 a State
Council for a Pennsylvania Fair Employment Practice Commission
was formed to promote fair employment.5" The efforts of this vol-
untary association to enact legislation to regulate discriminatory
practices in employment was the major driving force behind the
passage of the Act.5 4 Moreover, the need for anti-discrimination
legislation was demonstrated by a 1953 survey, wherein the Com-
mission of Industrial Race Relations reported that nine out of ten
establishments in Pennsylvania practiced some form of discrimina-
tion in employment.5 5 Thus, after ten years, with the efforts of
these groups and recognition of the need to foster equal opportuni-




50. 1955 Pa Laws 222, codified at 43 Pa Stat section 956 (Purdon 1955), as amended,
Pennsylvania Human Relations Act, 43 Pa Stat § 955 et seq (Purdon 1991).
51. Robert L. Sanders, Pennsylvania Human Relations Commission, 36 Temple L Q
514, 519 (1963). Prior to the passage of the act, employment discrimination had only been
prohibited as to contractors with the Commonwealth because of race, color, or creed. Act of
July 18, 1935, Pub L No 1173, codified at 43 Pa Stat § 153 (Purdon 1952). Sanders, 36
Temple L Q at 515 n 5.
52. Id at 519.
53. Id.
54. Id. The Council was organized and directed on a voluntary basis by an association
comprised of civic, labor, veteran, church and other social service groups. Id.
55. Id at 520. The Industrial Race Relations Commission was established in 1952 by
Governor John S. Fine for the purpose of gaining support for fair employment legislation. Id
at 51. The Commission undertook a survey of 1,229 firms in Pennsylvania employing nearly
900,000 workers in order to display the need for the legislation. Id.
56. Id at 519-20. The act, as originally enacted, read:
Section 952. Findings of Fact and Declaration of Policy.
(a) The practice or policy of discrimination against individuals or groups by reason of
their race, color, religious creed, ancestry, age, or national origin is a matter of con-
cern of the Commonwealth. Such discrimination foments domestic strife and unrest,
threatens the rights and privileges of the inhabitants of the Commonwealth, and un-
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Act led to the appointment of a Pennsylvania Fair Employment
Practice Commission whose function was to prevent discrimination
in employment.
5 7
Subsequent to enactment, the Act's application became unclear.
Specifically, no provision had been made for the PHRC and the
courts to ascertain whether a complainant under the Act had set
forth a prima facie case of employment discrimination. For in-
stance, in McPherson v Connellsville Joint School Board, 5  the
trial court reversed the PHRC's finding that McPherson, a black
teacher, had made out a case of illegal race discrimination." Mc-
Pherson had applied for a permanent teaching position with the
Connellsville School District.6 0 After interviewing her, the Joint
School Board chose a white teacher with substantially less qualifi-
cations." McPherson testified that when she asked the President
of the Joint School Board why she had not been chosen, he indi-
cated it was because of her race.a2 The PHRC opined that Mc-
Pherson had set forth a prima facie case of illegal discrimination
under the Act and ordered that she be hired.6 On appeal,6 the
trial court reversed and held that because the President of the
School Board had not testified at the hearing as to what he told
dermines the foundations of a free democratic state .
Fair Employment Practice Act, 43 Pa Stat § 952 (Purdon 1955), as amended, Human Rela-
tions Act, 43 Pa Stat § 952 (Purdon 1991).
The foregoing section now reads:
Section 952. Findings of Fact and Declaration of Policy.
(a) The practice or policy of discrimination against individuals or groups by reason of
their race, color, familial status, religious creed, ancestry, age, sex, national origin,
handicap or disability, use of guideor support animals because of the blindness, deaf-
ness or physical handicap of the user or because the user is a handler or trainer of
support or guide animals is a matter of concern of the Commonwealth. ....
43 Pa Stat § 952 (Purdon 1991).
57. Sanders, 36 Temple L Q at 520 (cited in note 51). The Commission is now called
the PHRC. The PHRC must foster the right to freedom from discrimination in employ-
ment, housing, and public accommodations under Act. 43 Pa Stat § 953 (Purdon 1991).
For a discussion of the procedure involved in filing a complaint with the PHRC, see Wil-
liam H. Lamb, Proof of Discrimination at the Commission Level, 39 Temple L Q 299, 312-
13 (1966).
58. 32 Pa D & C 2d 706 (1963):
59. McPherson, 32 Pa D & C 2d at 706.
60. Id at 708.
61. Id at 709.
62. Id at 711.
63. Id at 707.
64. Judicial review was to the common pleas court pursuant to the Pennsylvania
Human Relations Act, 43 Pa Stat § 960 (Purdon 1961), repealed by Act of 1978, Pub L No




McPherson, her testimony of their conversation was hearsay and
inadmissable. 5 Thus, although the PHRC believed that McPher-
son had made out a prima facie case by proving opening, applica-
tion, qualification, rejection, and someone less qualified hired, the
trial court found the evidence insufficient and required more direct
evidence of discrimination."
Later, in Philadelphia v Human Relations Commission6 7 the
commonwealth court reversed an order of the PHRC under which
the City of Philadelphia was to grant the complainant an opportu-
nity to apply for the position of policeman. 8 The complainant in
Philadelphia was a female who was prohibited from applying for
the position of policeman but permitted to apply for a policewo-
man position.69 On appeal, the commonwealth court reversed and
concluded that there existed no specific and separate application
for the position of policeman; thus, the position was not available
to the complainant. While the court failed to reach the question
of how one could make out a prima facie case under the Act, the
court did demand at least that the plaintiff prove that the position
was available.71 Moreover, the court indicated that every munici-
pality must be able to establish its own standards for employment,
written or unwritten, and that these standards are presumed valid
until attacked. 2 The court further asserted that when a complaint
goes to hearing, the burden lies with the plaintiff and the PHRC to
prove their case .7 Finally, the court stated that the PHRC cannot
try to shift the burden of proof onto the defendant, as in an ex-
emption case.74
65. McPherson, 32 Pa D & C 2d at 711.
66. Lamb, 39 Temple L Q at 329-30 (cited in note 57).
67. 4 Pa Commw 506, 287 A2d 703 (1972).
68. Philadelphia, 287 A2d at 703.
69. Id at 705.
70. Id at 706.
71. Id at 707.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id at 707-08. The Guidelines on Discrimination Because of Sex, as written by the
Commission, provide:
Section 6. Bona Fide Occupational Qualifications
(A) Section 5 provides that the Act shall not apply if the practices defined as unlaw-
ful are based on a bona fide occupational qualification. Such exemptions from the
coverage of the Human Relations Act are not to be granted liberally but they will be
given in appropriate cases. The procedure for securing such exemptions is to write to
the Commission requesting a[n] . . . exemption and stating: . . . 2. The reasons for
requesting the exemption..
Guidelines on Discrimination Because of Sex, 1 Pennsylvania Bulletin No. 24, section 6 (De-
1993
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The question of what a complainant must prove under the Act
was presented in Romain v Middletown Area School District.76 In
Romain, the court reversed the PHRC's findings that illegal race
discrimination in employment had occurred under the Act because
of the PHRC's failure to prove that the complainant was "best
able and most competent to perform the services required. '7 6 The
court opined that although the PHRC found that complainant was
"best able and most competent", this did not impute such a find-
ing to the hiring officials, provided their conclusion was not racially
motivated. 77 The court determined that there was insufficient evi-
dence to conclude that the employers believed the complainant
was "best qualified and most competent".78 Furthermore, the court
found no evidence that their decision not to hire her was racially
motivated e.7  Essentially, the court required a showing of "best able
and most competent" as part of the plaintiff's burden in making
out a prima 'facie case.80 Included in the plaintiff's burden was a
requirement of proving that the employer's decision was racially
motivated."'
In 1973 the Supreme Court of the United States, in McDonnell
Douglas Corporation v Green,82 established the elements which
comprised the prima facie case of discrimination under Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act.8 Here, the complainant, an afro-american
employee of McDonnell Douglas Corporation, had been laid off by
cember 19, 1970).
75. 1 Pa Commw 419, 275 A2d 400, 401 (1971). Here, the Middletown School District
hired sixteen other teachers instead of the plaintiff, a black teacher. Romain, 275 A2d at
401. The hiring official admitted that he would have found Mrs. Romain more qualified over







82. 411 US 792, 802 (1973).
83. See note 32 and accompanying text. The Civil Rights Act and the Pennsylvania
Human Relations Act are analogues; both acts make discriminatory practices in employ-
ment aimed at certain groups unlawful. See note 3 and note 31. The Pennsylvania Supreme
Court, in General Electric Corporation v Pennsylvania Human Relations Commission, 469
Pa 292, 365 A2d 649 (1976), first adopted the federal test promulgated in McDonnell in
recognition of the similarity between federal and Pennsylvania fair employment laws. Gen-
eral Electric, 365 A2d at 654-55. Essentially, the court was in agreement with the purpose of
the test to require that a prima facie case be set forth by the complainant, thereby shifting
the burden on the employer to produce legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for its actions.
Id at 655-56.
Vol. 31:607
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the corporation through a reduction in its work force.8' Believing
this discharge to be racially motivated, the complainant partici-
pated in several disruptive activities against the corporation."
Subsequent to these activities, the corporation advertised that it
was seeking applicants for a position for which the complainant
was qualified. 6 Thereafter, the complainant re-applied for employ-
ment and was rejected, purportedly because of his participation in
the disruptive activities.8 7 Hence, the complainant filed a com-
plaint with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
claiming violations of the Civil Rights Act. 8 The Commission
made no findings on the allegation of racial bias, and the district
court dismissed the claim of racial discrimination." On appeal, the
Eighth Circuit reversed the dismissal and remanded.90 The Su-
preme Court granted certiorari ". . . to clarify the standards gov-
erning the disposition of an action challenging employment dis-
crimination. . .. "91
The Supreme Court, concluding that the complainant should be
permitted to pursue his claim under the Act, set forth a four-prong
test to determine whether the complainant set forth a prima facie
case of racial discrimination. 2 The Court asserted that the initial
burden is on the complainant to establish the following:
84. McDonnell, 411 US at 794.
85. Id at 794-95. In order to protest against his discharge respondent participated in
a "stall-in" in which teams of cars were lined up to block traffic going to McDonnell Doug-
las. Id. Respondent also participated in or knew of a "lock in" against the Corporation
which had a chain and padlock placed on the front door of one building so that ihe occu-
pants could not exit. Id at 795.
86. Id at 796.
87. Id.
88. Id. The complainant claimed that McDonnell Douglas refused to hire him be-
cause of his race and involvement in the civil rights movement, and thus violated sections
703(a)(1) and 704(a) of the Civil Rights Act, 42 USC § 2000e-3(a) (1992). Id. The Commis-
sion found that the Corporation had violated section 704(a) of the Act. Id at 797. The dis-
trict court and Eighth Circuit held that the complainant's activities were not protected. Id.
§ 704(a) in pertinent part provides: "It shall be unlawful ... for an employer to discrimi-
nate against any of his employees or applicants . . . because he has opposed any practice
made unlawful employment practice . 42 USC § 2000e-3(a) (1992). Section 703(a)(1) is
cited in note 31.
89. McDonnell, 411 US at 797. Specifically, the districtcourt found that the Commis-
sion did not make a determination of ". . . reasonable cause to believe that a violation of
that section [section 703(a)(1)] had been committed." Id.
90. Id at 797. The court reasoned that the Commission need not make a determina-
tion of reasonable cause to raise a claim under section 703(a)(1) of the Civil Rights Act, 42
USC § 2000e-2 (1992), in federal court. Id.
91. Id at 798.
92. Id at 802.
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(i) that he belongs to a racial minority;
(ii) that he applied and was qualified for a job for which the employer
was seeking applicants;
(iii) that, despite his qualifications, he was rejected; and
(iv) that, after his rejection, the position remained open and the
employer continued to seek applicants from persons of complainant's
qualifications.98
Furthermore, once the complainant had met this initial burden,
the burden shifted to the employer to provide a ". . . legitimate,
non-discriminatory reason for the employee's rejection."
'9'
Subsequent to the decision in McDonnell, the Commonwealth
Court of Pennsylvania, in G.C. Murphy Co. v Pennsylvania
Human Relations Commission,"5 addressed the complainant's bur-
den of proof in Pennsylvania under the Act."6 The court adopted
the four-prong test and the burden shifting model promulgated in
McDonnell Douglas;97 however, the court set forth an additional
requirement under the Pennsylvania Act.9 Specifically, a com-
plainant under the Act must also demonstrate that ". . . the indi-
vidual is the best able and most competent to perform the services
required.""
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania rejected this approach in
General Electric Corporation v Pennsylvania Human Relations
Commission.100  Here, females employed by General Electric
claimed the company had engaged in sexually discriminatory prac-
tices during its coil department phase out.101 Specifically, the
women alleged that male employees with less seniority were of-
93. Id. The Court noted that the facts will vary in cases brought under Title VII and
that this test required from this respondent may not be applicable to every differing factual
situation. Id at 802 n 13.
94. Id at 802. The Court here addressed only racial discrimination. Id. Nonetheless,
this test is adaptable to the nature of the discrimination that has been alleged and has also
been employed in sex discrimination cases. See, for example, East v Romine, Inc., 518 F2d
332 (5th Cir 1975).
95. 12 Pa Commw 20, 314 A2d 356 (1974). Here, the complainant was an afro-ameri-
can with experience in retail and restaurant work. G. C. Murphy, 314 A2d at 357. She was
hired to work in defendant's retail store on part-time basis as a prerequisite to permanent
employment. Id. During this period, defendant hired three white females to do full-time
restaurant work and one white female to work full-time in retail. Id.
96. Id at 357-58.
97. McDonnell, 411 US at 802.
98. G.C. Murphy, 314 A2d at 358.
99. Id citing the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act, 43 Pa Stat section 955(a) (Pur-
don 1991). Therefore, since this additional element was not established in this case, the
plaintiff failed to meet her burden. G.C. Murphy, 314 A2d at 358.
100. General Electric, 365 A2d 649 (1976).
101. Id at 651.
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fered full time positions with other departments while most women
were laid off.'" 2 The PHRC found that the requirement that com-
plainant prove she was "best able and most competent" was not
applicable in this case. 03 The commonwealth court, relying on pre-
cedent law found in G. C. Murphy and Romain, reversed as to this
issue.'"° The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania disagreed with the
commonwealth court and embraced the McDonnell test.10 5 The
court held that in order to give the Act its intended purpose, the
burden of proving "best able and most competent" must reside
with the employer. 06 Specifically, the "best able and most compe-
tent" language of the Act was intended to operate in the same
manner as the burden shifting device, known as the "business ne-
cessity doctrine", operated in Title VII cases. 0 7 That is, once a
complainant proved the four elements necessary to set forth a
prima facie case, the burden shifted to the employer to demon-
strate that its selection had been based on legitimate business-re-
lated reasons.10 8 Accordingly, the court contended:
Where employment decisions have been based upon the employer's subjec-
tive assessments, it is the employer alone who can articulate the rationale
behind his decisions. .... In the case where subjective standards have been
employed the burden of proving relative qualifications might well be an im-
possible one. 109
Moreover, the court reasoned that an employer had easier access to
the facts that would have proven the qualifications of those em-
ployees retained and those laid off.' 10 Thus, the court concluded
that a complainant's burden of proof under the Act would be the
same as it would in a federal discrimination case and would not
include an additional requirement of proving one is "best able and
most competent.""'
102. Id at 652-53.
103. Id at 654.
104. Id. The court here relied on the decisions in G. C. Murphy, 314 A2d at 358, and
Romain, 275 A2d at 401. Id.
105. Id at 656-57.
106. Id at 657.
107. Id at 655-57. The "business necessity doctrine" was first adopted by the United
States Supreme Court in, Griggs v Duke Power Company, 401 US 424 (1971). General Elec-
tric, 365 A2d at 655. The doctrine provides that an employer must not guarantee a job to
every person without respect to qualifications; instead, an applicant may be excluded for
reasons related to job performance. Id.
108. Id at 655-56.
109. Id at 657 (citations omitted).
110. Id.
111. Id at 655-57.
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In Allegheny Housing Rehabilitation Corporation v Penn-
sylvanin Human Relations Commission1 2 the Pennsylvania Su-
preme Court demonstrated the proper application of the McDon-
nell four-prong test and clarified the nature of the defendant's
burden in cases arising under the Act."3 This case involved the
termination of a female security guard by Allegheny Housing after
two months of employment. " The complainant alleged the dis-
charge was due to her sex, while the defendant alleged she was
terminated pursuant to an unwritten contract that security guards
were only to be drawn from members of a local Certified Police
Unit.1 1 5 In remanding the case for further proceedings, the court
outlined the proper application of the McDonnell test."' First, the
four elements that were established in the McDonnell test must be
proven by the complainant in order to set forth a prima facie case
of discrimination.1 1 7 The court did not address the issue of whether
the "best able and most competent" element must also be proven,
but contended that the focus of their review was limited solely to
the proper application of the McDonnell test.' With regard to the
complainant's prima facie case the court noted:
If a plaintiff must prove a prima facie case by producing the evidence of her
qualifications before the defendant is obligated to proceed with the defense,
112. 516 Pa 124, 532 A2d 315 (1987).
113. Allegheny Housing, 532 A2d at 317-20.
114. Id at 316-17.
115. Id at 317, 319.
116. Id at 318-21. Here, the court noted that its clarification of the law was based on
United States Supreme Court decisions in Title VII cases which interpreted the McDonnell
test. Allegheny Housing, 532 A2d at 317. Specifically, the court cited Texas Department of
Community Affairs v Burdine, 450 US 248 (1981) and U.S. Postal Service Board of Gover-
nors v Aikens, 460 US 711 (1983) as the two cases on which its decision rested. Allegheny
Housing, 532 A2d at 318-21.
117. Id at 318 (citation omitted).
118. Id at 317 n 2. The court recognized that the "best able and most competent"
language in the Act has been a source of dispute in Pennsylvania. Id.
In Winn v Trans World Airlines, Inc., 506 Pa 138, 484 A2d 392 (1984), an equally divided
supreme court struggled with the issue and wrote separate opinions expressing essentially
two distinct views. Winn, 484 A2d at 393-97. Specifically, the opinions in support of af-
firming General Electric expressed that the "best able and most competent" language oper-
ates as part of the employer's burden of proof. Id at 394-96. In contrast, the opinion in
support of reversal believed that the "best able and most competent" language is unique to
the Act and is an additional element that a complainant must prove to meet its burden. Id
at 406.
Recently, in Pennsylvania Human Relations Commission v Johnstown Redevelopment
Authority, 527 Pa 71, 588 A2d 497 (1991), the supreme court noted that no majority of the
court has ever placed such an onerous burden of proving "best able and most competent" on
the plaintiff in order to establish a prima facie case. Johnstown, 588 A2d at 501 n 3.
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there will almost of necessity be, at the close of the plaintiff's case in chief,
evidence that she was qualified sufficient to avoid dismissal. . . . it is appro-
priate to the remedial purpose of the Act that the prima facie case not be an
onerous one."19
Once the plaintiff has met this initial burden, a rebuttable "pre-
sumption" of discrimination is created which, if the employer pro-
duced no evidence in response, would cause the plaintiff to pre-
vail.12 0 The nature of the burden which shifts to the defendant is
the burden of production; that is, the defendant must produce a
"legitimate, non-discriminatory reason" for its actions. 121 If such
evidence is presented, then the presumption of discrimination is
dropped and the question for the PHRC is whether, based on all of
the evidence presented, ". . . the plaintiff has persuaded it by a
preponderance of the evidence that the employer intentionally dis-
criminated against her."' 22 Thus, the question for the trier of fact
is which of the parties does it find more credible.'
2
1
In Fairfield the court utilized the Allegheny Housing analysis
and found that Henderson had not met her burden because she
failed to demonstrate that she was qualified for a job for which the
employer was seeking applicants. 2" That is, since she had testified
as to having certain physical ailments, the court found that she
had disqualified herself for the position. 25 The court did not find
crucial the fact that the fire company did not know that Hender-
son had physical ailments at the time of her application and in fact
did recommend her for membership. 2 Indeed, application of the
McDonnell test mandated that the fire company's reasons for not
accepting Henderson need not have been considered until Hender-
son had set forth her prima facie case. 2 '
On the other hand, the commonwealth court and Justice Zap-
pala contended that Henderson had proven that she was qualified
for the position.' 28 This author believes that Justice Zappala's in-
terpretation of the commonwealth court's holding was correct. In-
deed, the commonwealth court did not require that physical re-
119. Allegheny Housing, 532 A2d at 318-19.
120. Id at 319.
121. Id at 318.
122. Id.
123. Id at 319 (citation omitted).
124. Fairfield, 609 A2d at 805-06.
125. Id at 806.
126. Id.
127. See note 92 and accompanying text.
128. Id at 808 (Zappala dissenting).
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quirements be set out; instead, it concluded that Henderson's
physical ailments did not disqualify her for the fire fighter position
because there never were any physical requirements established for
this position.' " In fact, as the commonwealth court pointed out,
the fire company had never required that applicants submit to a
physical examination before acceptance.3 0
Moreover, the substantive purpose of the Act is to end all ves-
tiges of employment discrimination. 131 Permitting unequal treat-
ment of this type based on a finding of non-qualification frustrates
this purpose. In fact, the court in McDonnell had recognized that
rigid application of the four-prong test may not be appropriate in
all cases.' The majority opinion apparently ignored the substan-
tive mandate of the Act in favor of strict application of the Mc-
Donnell test.
Interestingly, the majority opinion did not end its analysis with
a finding of non-qualification. Instead, the court integrates the
"best able and most competent" clause into its decision.3 3 Specifi-
cally, the court found that because the Act defines discrimination
in terms of individuals that are "best able and most competent",
Henderson's own testimony that she cannot perform some fire
fighting tasks established that she ". . . cannot, as a matter of law,
make out a prima facie case of unlawful discrimination.' 3 s4 As Jus-
tice Cappy pointed out, the court had never before placed the bur-
den of proving "best able and most competent" on the plaintiff.13
The court did not assert an intention to overrule its decisions in
General Electric and subsequent cases which have held to the con-
trary. However, it is clear that the Fairfield court was imposing
this additional burden on the plaintiff.
Hence, it is possible that the PHRC and the lower courts may
interpret this decision as imposing an additional requirement on
the complainant. This is unfortunate for, as the court noted in
General Electric, the burden of establishing one's relative qualifi-
cations where subjective criteria were utilized by the employer may
be impossible.1 6 Undoubtedly, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
129. Id at 808 (Zappala dissenting).
130. Fairfield, 575 A2d at 156.
131. General Electric, 365 A2d at 655.
132. McDonnell, 411 US at 802 n 13.
133. Fairfield, 609 A2d at 807.
134. Id.
135. Id (Cappy Concurring).
136. General Electric, 365 A2d at 657.
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will be forced to revisit the issue of the "best able and most com-
petent" language in future cases and state its position of the law
more clearly.
Sandra E. Richetti

